Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Peleg, Bezalel (Συγγραφέας), Peters, Hans (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
Σειρά:Studies in Choice and Welfare,
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
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100 1 |a Peleg, Bezalel.  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Strategic Social Choice  |h [electronic resource] :  |b Stable Representations of Constitutions /  |c by Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters. 
264 1 |a Berlin, Heidelberg :  |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg,  |c 2010. 
300 |a XVIII, 154 p. 2 illus.  |b online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
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490 1 |a Studies in Choice and Welfare,  |x 1614-0311 
505 0 |a Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters. 
520 |a This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution. 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
650 0 |a Economic theory. 
650 0 |a Welfare economics. 
650 0 |a Social sciences. 
650 1 4 |a Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice. 
650 2 4 |a Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. 
650 2 4 |a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. 
650 2 4 |a Methodology of the Social Sciences. 
700 1 |a Peters, Hans.  |e author. 
710 2 |a SpringerLink (Online service) 
773 0 |t Springer eBooks 
776 0 8 |i Printed edition:  |z 9783642138744 
830 0 |a Studies in Choice and Welfare,  |x 1614-0311 
856 4 0 |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1  |z Full Text via HEAL-Link 
912 |a ZDB-2-SBE 
950 |a Business and Economics (Springer-11643)