Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Peleg, Bezalel (Συγγραφέας), Peters, Hans (Συγγραφέας) |
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Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | SpringerLink (Online service) |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
|
Σειρά: | Studies in Choice and Welfare,
|
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
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