Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /

• Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Peleg, Bezalel (Συγγραφέας), Peters, Hans (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
• Σειρά: Studies in Choice and Welfare,
• Θέματα: Game theory.; Economic theory.; Welfare economics.; Social sciences.; Economics.; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice.; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.; Methodology of the Social Sciences.

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• Representations of constitutions
• to Part I
• Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms
• Nash consistent representations
• Acceptable representations
• Strongly consistent representations
• Nash consistent representation through lottery models
• On the continuity of representations of constitutions
• Consistent voting
• to Part II
• Feasible elimination procedures
• Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.