Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Peleg, Bezalel (Author), Peters, Hans (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
Series:Studies in Choice and Welfare,
Subjects:
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ΒΚΠ - Πατρα: ALFd

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Call Number: 330.01 BAU
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ΒΚΠ - Πατρα: BSC

Holdings details from ΒΚΠ - Πατρα: BSC
Call Number: 330.01 BAU
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