Algorithmic Game Theory Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings /

• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Kontogiannis, Spyros (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Koutsoupias, Elias (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Spirakis, Paul G. (Επιμελητής έκδοσης)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2010.
• Σειρά: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6386
• Θέματα: Computer science.; Computers.; Numerical analysis.; Computer simulation.; Computers and civilization.; E-commerce.; Computer Science.; Simulation and Modeling.; e-Commerce/e-business.; Theory of Computation.; Models and Principles.; Computers and Society.; Numeric Computing.

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers
• How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?
• A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets
• Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market
• Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games
• Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics
• Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games
• On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games
• Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games
• On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play
• On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
• On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
• A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium
• Responsive Lotteries
• On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users
• Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games
• A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It
• The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements
• Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
• Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy
• Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
• On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms
• Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time
• The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant
• Truthful Fair Division
• No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand
• On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria
• 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties
• On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
• Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.