Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we...
| Main Author: | Horniacek, Milan (Author) |
|---|---|
| Corporate Author: | SpringerLink (Online service) |
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer,
2011.
|
| Series: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
649 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
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