Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Çetiner, Demet (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2013.
• Σειρά: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 668
• Θέματα: Business.; Production management.; Operations research.; Decision making.; Management science.; Game theory.; Business and Management.; Operation Research/Decision Theory.; Operations Research, Management Science.; Game Theory.; Operations Management.
• Φυσική περιγραφή: XV, 168 p. 27 illus. online resource.
• ISBN: 9783642358227
• ISSN: 0075-8442 ;

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.