Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Çetiner, Demet (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2013.
• Σειρά: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 668
• Θέματα: Business.; Production management.; Operations research.; Decision making.; Management science.; Game theory.; Business and Management.; Operation Research/Decision Theory.; Operations Research, Management Science.; Game Theory.; Operations Management.

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work p...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• Introduction
• Selected Topics in Revenue Management
• A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
• Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory
• Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game
• Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances
• Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances
• A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices
• Conclusion and Future Research
• Appendix: Computational Study.