Equity Financing and Covenants in Venture Capital An Augmented Contracting Approach to Optimal German Contract Design /

Venture capital contracts define the rules of the investment for the venture capitalist and the portfolio company. They therefore have the potential to impact the success of the business and the venture capitalist's return. For this reason, contracts have recently attracted great research inter...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Jung-Senssfelder, Karoline (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Wiesbaden : DUV, 2006.
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
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100 1 |a Jung-Senssfelder, Karoline.  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Equity Financing and Covenants in Venture Capital  |h [electronic resource] :  |b An Augmented Contracting Approach to Optimal German Contract Design /  |c by Karoline Jung-Senssfelder. 
264 1 |a Wiesbaden :  |b DUV,  |c 2006. 
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505 0 |a Venture Capital and Contracting -- Review of Academic Literature -- Contract Design Approach to Cash Flow Incentive Mechanisms -- Empirical Evidence on Contractual Architecture -- Synthesis -- Conclusion. 
520 |a Venture capital contracts define the rules of the investment for the venture capitalist and the portfolio company. They therefore have the potential to impact the success of the business and the venture capitalist's return. For this reason, contracts have recently attracted great research interest. Karoline Jung-Senssfelder presents the first augmented contracting analysis, focusing on the interaction of both, financial instruments and covenants, in the creation of incentives to the contracting parties. With a focus on the German market, she integrates the findings of her model-based theoretical and survey-based empirical analyses to derive value-adding implications for an incentive-compatible contract design in the German venture capital market. 
650 0 |a Finance. 
650 0 |a Public finance. 
650 1 4 |a Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Public Economics. 
650 2 4 |a Finance, general. 
710 2 |a SpringerLink (Online service) 
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776 0 8 |i Printed edition:  |z 9783835003354 
856 4 0 |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9188-7  |z Full Text via HEAL-Link 
912 |a ZDB-2-SBE 
950 |a Business and Economics (Springer-11643)