A World Without Values Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory /

For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn’t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral state...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Joyce, Richard (Επιμελητής έκδοσης), Kirchin, Simon (Επιμελητής έκδοσης)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010.
Σειρά:Philosophical Studies Series ; 114
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
LEADER 03338nam a22004455i 4500
001 978-90-481-3339-0
003 DE-He213
005 20151120181351.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2010 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a 9789048133390  |9 978-90-481-3339-0 
024 7 |a 10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0  |2 doi 
040 |d GrThAP 
050 4 |a BJ1-1725 
072 7 |a HPQ  |2 bicssc 
072 7 |a PHI005000  |2 bisacsh 
082 0 4 |a 170  |2 23 
245 1 2 |a A World Without Values  |h [electronic resource] :  |b Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory /  |c edited by Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin. 
264 1 |a Dordrecht :  |b Springer Netherlands,  |c 2010. 
300 |a XXIV, 238 p.  |b online resource. 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
347 |a text file  |b PDF  |2 rda 
490 1 |a Philosophical Studies Series ;  |v 114 
505 0 |a Against Ethics -- Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem -- Patterns of Objectification -- Mackie's Internalisms -- Mackie's Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief -- Mackie on Practical Reason -- The Argument from Moral Experience -- Beyond the Error Theory -- Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness -- A Tension in the Moral Error Theory -- Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality -- The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem -- Abolishing Morality. 
520 |a For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn’t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one’s practical life? Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie’s views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of meta-ethics. A World Without Values presents state-of-the-art arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any meta-ethicist’s bookshelf for some years to come. 
650 0 |a Philosophy. 
650 0 |a Ethics. 
650 1 4 |a Philosophy. 
650 2 4 |a Ethics. 
700 1 |a Joyce, Richard.  |e editor. 
700 1 |a Kirchin, Simon.  |e editor. 
710 2 |a SpringerLink (Online service) 
773 0 |t Springer eBooks 
776 0 8 |i Printed edition:  |z 9789048133383 
830 0 |a Philosophical Studies Series ;  |v 114 
856 4 0 |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0  |z Full Text via HEAL-Link 
912 |a ZDB-2-SHU 
950 |a Humanities, Social Sciences and Law (Springer-11648)