A World Without Values Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory /
For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn’t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral state...
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
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Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands,
2010.
|
Σειρά: | Philosophical Studies Series ;
114 |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Against Ethics
- Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem
- Patterns of Objectification
- Mackie's Internalisms
- Mackie's Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief
- Mackie on Practical Reason
- The Argument from Moral Experience
- Beyond the Error Theory
- Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness
- A Tension in the Moral Error Theory
- Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality
- The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem
- Abolishing Morality.