Human Capacities and Moral Status

Many debates about the moral status of things—for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animals—eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in question—for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capaci...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: DiSilvestro, Russell (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 2010.
Σειρά:Philosophy and Medicine, 108
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
  • You Are Not What You Think: Capacities, Human Organisms, and Persons
  • Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Also: Humans, Our Capacities, and the Powers We Share
  • The Only Game in Town: Why Capacities Must Matter Morally
  • Little People: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Potential
  • Not Just Damaged Goods: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Marginal Cases
  • Old Objections and New Directions: Capacities and Moral Status at the Very Borders of Human Life.