Human Capacities and Moral Status
Many debates about the moral status of things—for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animals—eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in question—for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capaci...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer,
2010.
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Σειρά: | Philosophy and Medicine,
108 |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- You Are Not What You Think: Capacities, Human Organisms, and Persons
- Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Also: Humans, Our Capacities, and the Powers We Share
- The Only Game in Town: Why Capacities Must Matter Morally
- Little People: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Potential
- Not Just Damaged Goods: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Marginal Cases
- Old Objections and New Directions: Capacities and Moral Status at the Very Borders of Human Life.