Groups, Rules and Legal Practice

Ever since Hart´s The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when th...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Sánchez Brigido, Rodrigo Eduardo (Συγγραφέας)
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010.
Σειρά:Law and Philosophy Library, 89
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
  • Three Tests
  • Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (I): Hart’s Account and the Coordinative-Convention Approach
  • Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (II): Raz’s Account
  • Collective Intentional Activities: Shapiro’s Model
  • Kutz on Collective Intentional Activities. Building an Alternative Model: Groups Which Act with No Normative Unity
  • The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type (I). Non-developed Instances of Legal Practice
  • Gilbert’s Account of Collective Activities
  • On Agreements
  • The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type II. Other-Regarding, Developed Institutions. Developed Instances of the Judiciary
  • Developed Instances of Legal Practice. Meeting the Tests.