Groups, Rules and Legal Practice
Ever since Hart´s The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when th...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands,
2010.
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Σειρά: | Law and Philosophy Library,
89 |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Three Tests
- Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (I): Hart’s Account and the Coordinative-Convention Approach
- Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (II): Raz’s Account
- Collective Intentional Activities: Shapiro’s Model
- Kutz on Collective Intentional Activities. Building an Alternative Model: Groups Which Act with No Normative Unity
- The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type (I). Non-developed Instances of Legal Practice
- Gilbert’s Account of Collective Activities
- On Agreements
- The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type II. Other-Regarding, Developed Institutions. Developed Instances of the Judiciary
- Developed Instances of Legal Practice. Meeting the Tests.