Persons, Moral Worth, and Embryos A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments /
“Bioethicists have achieved consensus on two ideas pertaining to beginning of life issues: (1) persons are those beings capable of higher-order cognition, or self-consciousness, and (2) it is impermissible to kill only persons. As a consequence, a consensus is reached regarding the permissibility of...
| Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
|---|---|
| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | |
| Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands,
2011.
|
| Σειρά: | Philosophy and Medicine,
111 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Introduction: What are Persons? What is Valuable? Stephen Napier
- Part 1. Philosophical Considerations
- I was Once a Fetus: That is Why Abortion is Wrong Alexander Pruss
- Brain Life and the Argument from Potential: Affirming the Ontological Status of Human Embryos and Fetuses, Jason T. Eberl and Brandon P. Brown
- The Human Being, a Person of Substance: A Response to Dean Stretton, Francis J. Beckwith
- The Concept of Person in Bioethics, Anselm Winfried Müller
- Abortion and Virtue Ethics Mathew Lu
- Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism, and Moral Status, David Hershenov
- The Christian Hypothesis, David W. Fagerberg
- Fetal Interests, Fetal Persons, and Human Goods, Christopher Tollefsen
- Part 2. Scientific Considerations
- Fetal Pains and Fetal Brains, A.A. Howsepian
- A Biological Definition of the Human Embryo, Maureen L. Condic
- Part 3. Perspectives from Law and Political Philosophy
- Public Reason and Abortion Revisited, David Thunder
- Sexual Markets and the Law, Helen M. Alvaré
- Index. .
