Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Basov, Suren (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Singapore : Springer Singapore : Imprint: Springer, 2016.
• Σειρά: Studies in Economic Theory, 30
• Θέματα: Behavioral economics.; Economics.; Behavioral/Experimental Economics.

This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality h...

Πίνακας περιεχομένων:

• Chapter 1 Preface
• Part I Mechanism Design under Bounded Rationality
• Chapter 2 Introduction
• Chapter 3 Complexity constraints and mechanism design
• Chapter 4 Learning, probabilistic choice, and mechanism design
• Chapter 5 Some other models of mechanism design under bounded rationality
• Chapter 6 Conclusions
• Part II Social Norms and Mechanism Design
• Chapter 7 Peer Pressure and Agency Relationship
• Chapter 8 Statistical Mechanics of High Performing Working Systems
• Chapter 9 Optimal contracting in social environment
• Part III Lessons learnt and directions for future research.