Parse of China Gradual Reform Logic Based on Bargaining Game /

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Tong, Yilun (Συγγραφέας)
• Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Μορφή: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: Singapore : Springer Singapore : Imprint: Springer, 2017.
• Θέματα: Economic theory.; Development economics.; Economics.; Development Economics.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.

 This book focuses on the gradual reform of Chinese society since China’s opening up to the world, and gives a unified explanation of the process based on bargaining theory. It studies institutional changes as a non-violent bargaining process in which different parties constantly make adjustments to social contracts by following the tradition of classical economics initiated by Adam Smith. The book has two major conclusions: First, bargaining-driven institutional reform ensures both efficiency and equality. Second, bargaining-driven institutional reform involves the principles of, and is an essential approach to democracy. The book’s interpretation of the economic phenomena and the reform mechanism in China not only reflects China’s 30-year reform experience, but also pays due homage to the academic heritage in the related areas. Yet, as a departure from traditional theories of the Chinese reform, this book lays out a unified and legitimate theoretical framework in order to clarify the international misinterpretations of China’s social change and institutional reform. 

 The Theoretical Context of Institutional Reform -- The Theoretical Properties of the Institutional Reform of China -- Bargaining Theory’s Contribution to Social Science -- Bargaining Game -- An Economic Description of Institution -- The General Bargaining Context of Institutional Reform -- The Bargaining Context of the Institutional Reform of China -- The Bargaining Equilibrium of the Institutional Reform of China -- Theoretical Implications of the Bargaining-Driven Institutional Reform of China -- The Logical Defects of the Two-Person Bargaining Game to Characterize Institutional Reform -- A Naturalistic Understanding of the Institutional Reform of China.