Domain Conditions and Social Rationality
This book primarily focuses on the domain conditions under which a number of important classes of binary social decision rules give rise to rational social preferences. One implication of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems is that every non-oligarchic social decision rule that satisfies the condition of...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
Μορφή: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Ηλ. βιβλίο |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Singapore :
Springer Singapore : Imprint: Springer,
2019.
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Έκδοση: | 1st ed. 2019. |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full Text via HEAL-Link |
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
- Chapter 1. Introduction
- Chapter 2. The Preliminaries
- Chapter 3. The Method of Majority Decision
- Chapter 4. The Strict Majority Rule
- Chapter 5. The Class of Semi-Strict Majority Rules
- Chapter 6. Special Majority Rules
- Chapter 7. The Class of Strict Majority Rules
- Chapter 8. The Class of Pareto-Inclusive Strict Majority Rules
- Chapter 9. Social Decision Rules Which Are Simple Games
- Chapter 10. Neutral and Monotonic Binary Social Decision Rules
- Chapter 11. Quasi-Transitive Individual Preferences
- Chapter 12. Summary and Concluding Remarks.