| Περίληψη: | In section II of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) Kant holds that the rational human being - and every rational being in general - is the objective ground for the self-determination of every rational will, an unconditionally valuable end in itself. In the same work though, he appears to indiscriminately identify as end in itself “humanity”, “persons”, “morality”, “dignity”, “rational being” and “rational nature”. Not surprisingly, this manifoldness has been fueling considerable debates among the most prominent contemporary Kantian scholars over the specification of that strictest property or capacity that renders us humans ends of unconditional esteem. The purpose of this paper is to provide a reading in support of the view that, in Kantian transcendental moral theory, the rational capacity in question can only be “personality”, construed as pure practical reason or autonomy of the will.
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