| Περίληψη: | John Searle has proposed a theory of mind, named Biological Naturalism, as a straightforward solution to the mind-body problem. He aims at overcoming the burdens that the philosophical tradition, at least since Descartes, poses to the contemporary philosophy of mind. He claims that both dualism (and the approaches that stem from it) and materialism (and the approaches that stem from it, functionalism included) are based on false assumptions regarding what we refer to, until today, by mind or body. Aristotle seems to have a similar view about the soul. He struggles with his predecessors’ views, which could also be regarded as divided in two approaches, though less restrictive, one dualistic (with Plato as its most important representative) and another that could be viewed as reductive (held by Presocratics like Democritus). The similarity between the two philosophers has been already pointed out by Alan Code (1991) in his article Searle, Aristotle and the Mind Body Problem. As far as I know, this was the only attempt to compare the two theories, along with that of functionalism which is presented as quite different from both. In this essay I will examine the similarity between Aristotle’s and Searle’s positions through some basic elements of the work of both philosophers regarding the subject, picking out those that better demonstrate that similarity. I will focus on some aspects of perception and consciousness, not only because of their significant role in any possible theory about the mind or soul, but also because they seem to be based on intuitions as well as leading to aspects that are, up to a considerable point, shared by the two philosophers. My furthest intention is that this essay could be viewed as having two parallel perspectives: one that could set the fundamentals of supporting an interpretation on a specific selection of Aristotle’s text in De Anima, and a second that could suggest that the examined similarities may be utilized in a contemporary theory of mind such as Biological Naturalism. In the first part of this essay, I will focus on Searle’s Biological Naturalism and its way of overcoming the dilemma between materialism and dualism. Furthermore, I will examine how it copes with matters such as mental causation or Kripke’s Modal Argument. However, I will not make an exhaustive examination of the various theories proposed along with Biological Naturalism. I will try to demonstrate some of the basic implications of the traditional mental-physical distinction, how Searle thinks that he can overcome it when others fail to do so, and finally to show how it affects contemporary Aristotle’s scholars. In the second part, I will examine an alternative reading in Aristotle’s texts, provided by Victor Caston as a way to overcome a similar in its intuitions and assumptions, as we will see, dilemma between the two broad categories of Aristotle’s interpretations: Literalism and Spiritualism.
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