| Περίληψη: | The present dissertation is divided into three chapters: 1. Justice, 2. Pleasure, 3. Friendship. All three topics are seen from the point of view of their contribution to our understanding of the most fundamental starting point of political science, happiness (eudaimonia); for happiness is the archê and at the same time the telos, the end at which practical knowledge aims. That is to say, they are seen as pointing to complementary presuppositions in order for human moral agency to flourish. Despite the tensions between the two candidates for the best/happiest way of life, phronêsis and sophia, my analysis in all three chapters focuses on the modes of their intertwinement and in the way they determine, respectively, the perspective of the agent (first-person perspective) and the perspective of the spectator (third-person perspective). As the title of my dissertation implies, the above epistemological issues are elaborated within the context of the so-called civic virtues which provide the appropriate ground because of the interplay to which they attest between the polis, on the one hand, and the psuchê, on the other.
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