Πρωτοπροσωπική μη-εργαλειακή αλληλεξάρτηση αντίληψης-πράξης

• Κύριος συγγραφέας: Πίκολας, Κωνσταντίνος
• Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Παγωνδιώτης, Κώστας
• Μορφή: Thesis
• Γλώσσα: English
• Έκδοση: 2015
• Θέματα: Non-instrumental interdependence; Temporalization; Perception; Enactivism; Kinesthesis; Motivation; Agency; 121.34; Μη-εργαλειακή αλληλεξάρτηση; Χρονοποίηση; Αντίληψη; Σχέση κινήτρων; Κιναίσθηση; Κιναισθητηριακή θεωρία; Πράττειν

The goal of the present study is to examine the enactive approaches of Susan Hurley and Alva Noë through the prism of Husserlian temporal constitution. In the first part we offer criticism to Hurley’s notion of ‘non-instrumental interdependence of perception and action’. Her grounding of this interdependence on the subpersonal level constitutional sensory input-motor output interdependence will be viewed as necessary but not sufficient for the first-personal level perception-action interdependence. That sufficiency can only be provided through an exposition of their constitutive interdependence at the first-personal level itself by a phenomenological analysis of perceptual and intentional acts. In the second part we examine Noë’s notion of the ‘virtuality’ of perceptual content. By interpreting his relevant concept of ‘free access’ according to the proposed motif of ‘expectation fulfillment’ we suggest that the problem of the virtuality of content should be interpreted as the problem of the constitution of the temporally enduring perceptual object. We shall work out this issue by appealing to the Husserlian account of perception. By a constructive reading of Husserl’s notions of ‘motivation’ and ‘kinesthesis’ we arrive at the ‘subjective temporal self-relating core’ of perceptual and motor acts. It is this functional temporal self-relatedness, described exclusively on the first-personal descriptive level, that finally offers us the sought after first-personal non-instrumental interdependence of perception and action. We finally suggest that augmented by this notion the sensorimotor approaches can have a better understanding of the neuroscientific explanandum and thus be better informed in their potential epistemological role. Some empirical literature is reviewed at the closure of the study in support of our case.