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oapen-20.500.12657-236872024-03-22T19:23:03Z Chapter Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism Kusch, Martin Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja Wiltsche, Harald A. Metaphilosophy Analytic philosophy continental philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDH Philosophical traditions and schools of thought thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDH Philosophical traditions and schools of thought::QDHR Western philosophy from c 1800 thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge One important strand in the contemporary debate over epistemological relativism focuses on the question whether, and to what extent, Wittgenstein in “On Certainty” (1969) leaned towards this position. This paper is a contribution to this strand. My discussion has four parts. I shall begin by out lining my interpretation of Wittgensteinian certainties. Subsequently I shall briefly introduce some central arguments for and against attributing epistemic relativism to “On Certainty”. This will be followed by a sketch of the cluster of ideas that–on my analysis–define important versions of the doctrine in question. And finally I shall give my own interpretation of “On Certainty” in relation to epistemic relativism. 2019-11-20 23:55 2020-01-07 16:47:06 2020-04-01T09:26:04Z 2020-04-01T09:26:04Z 2016 chapter 1006457 OCN: 1135854731 9783110448344; 9783110448870 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/23687 eng application/pdf n/a 80_[9783110450651 - Analytic] Wittgensteins.pdf De Gruyter Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium 10.1515/9783110450651-003 10.1515/9783110450651-003 2b386f62-fc18-4108-bcf1-ade3ed4cf2f3 4bde32f5-9076-4aa7-be18-b082d981348d 7292b17b-f01a-4016-94d3-d7fb5ef9fb79 9783110448344; 9783110448870 European Research Council (ERC) Berlin/Boston 339382 FP7 Ideas: European Research Council FP7-IDEAS-ERC - Specific Programme: "Ideas" Implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (2007 to 2013) open access
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English
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One important strand in the contemporary debate over epistemological relativism focuses on the question whether, and to what extent, Wittgenstein in “On Certainty” (1969) leaned towards this position. This paper is a contribution to this strand. My discussion has four parts. I shall begin by out lining my interpretation of Wittgensteinian certainties. Subsequently I shall briefly introduce some central arguments for and against attributing epistemic relativism to “On Certainty”. This will be followed by a sketch of the cluster of ideas that–on my analysis–define important versions of the doctrine in question. And finally I shall give my own interpretation of “On Certainty” in relation to epistemic relativism.
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80_[9783110450651 - Analytic] Wittgensteins.pdf
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80_[9783110450651 - Analytic] Wittgensteins.pdf
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80_[9783110450651 - Analytic] Wittgensteins.pdf
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title_full |
80_[9783110450651 - Analytic] Wittgensteins.pdf
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80_[9783110450651 - Analytic] Wittgensteins.pdf
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80_[9783110450651 - Analytic] Wittgensteins.pdf
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80_[9783110450651 - analytic] wittgensteins.pdf
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De Gruyter
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2019
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1799945219944218624
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