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oapen-20.500.12657-253332023-02-01T09:35:30Z Atomic Assurance Lanoszka, Alexander Political Science Do alliances curb states from developing nuclear weapons? If so, what kind of alliances work best and how do they function? This book looks at what makes alliances credible enough to prevent nuclear proliferation, how alliances can breakdown and encourage nuclear proliferation, and whether security guarantors like the United States can use their alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies. The author finds that military alliances are, surprisingly, less useful for preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons; that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; and that economic or technological reliance works better to reverse or to halt an ally’s nuclear bid than other factors. This book uses intensive case studies on West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, to examine this critical issue. 2019-03-29 23:55 2020-03-10 03:00:36 2020-04-01T10:34:37Z 2020-04-01T10:34:37Z 2018-11-15 book 1004766 OCN: 1100542083 9781501729188 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/25333 eng application/pdf n/a 1004766.pdf Cornell University Press 10.7591/cornell/9781501729188.001.0001 103126 10.7591/cornell/9781501729188.001.0001 06a447d4-1d09-460f-8b1d-3b4b09d64407 b818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9 9781501729188 Knowledge Unlatched (KU) Ithaca, NY 103126 KU Select 2018: HSS Frontlist Books Knowledge Unlatched open access
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Do alliances curb states from developing nuclear weapons? If so, what kind of alliances work best and how do they function? This book looks at what makes alliances credible enough to prevent nuclear proliferation, how alliances can breakdown and encourage nuclear proliferation, and whether security guarantors like the United States can use their alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies. The author finds that military alliances are, surprisingly, less useful for preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons; that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; and that economic or technological reliance works better to reverse or to halt an ally’s nuclear bid than other factors. This book uses intensive case studies on West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, to examine this critical issue.
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