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oapen-20.500.12657-267922022-04-26T12:37:48Z Goodwill Impairment Sellhorn, Thorsten Bilanzpolitik Empirical Firmenwert Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Geschäftswert Goodwill Goodwill Impairment Impairment Investigation Offs Sellhorn SFAS under USA US-GAAP Wertberichtigung Write bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KF Finance & accounting::KFC Accounting::KFCX Accounting: study & revision guides bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KJ Business & management::KJM Management & management techniques::KJMV Management of specific areas::KJMV1 Budgeting & financial management In 2001, goodwill amortization in the US was eliminated in favor of an impairment-only approach, which, according to critics, gives managers vast discretion and opportunities for earnings management. Prior research suggests that discretionary asset write-offs are associated with economic factors and managers’ financial reporting objectives. Based on a systematic literature review, this study investigates for a comprehensive sample of US firms the determinants of goodwill write-off behavior. Regression analysis shows that write-off behavior is significantly explained by firms’ economic properties. Only in large, high-profile firms, incentives appear to be significant determinants. These findings suggest that the impairment-only approach does capture goodwill impairment at least to some extent. 2019-01-10 23:55 2018-12-01 23:55:55 2020-01-16 11:31:17 2020-04-01T11:23:42Z 2020-04-01T11:23:42Z 2018 book 1003253 OCN: 1082943952 9783631754986 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/26792 eng Bochumer Beitraege zur Unternehmensfuehrung application/pdf n/a 1003253.pdf Peter Lang International Academic Publishers 10.3726/b14014 10.3726/b14014 e927e604-2954-4bf6-826b-d5ecb47c6555 9783631754986 70 350 Bern open access
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In 2001, goodwill amortization in the US was eliminated in favor of an impairment-only approach, which, according to critics, gives managers vast discretion and opportunities for earnings management. Prior research suggests that discretionary asset write-offs are associated with economic factors and managers’ financial reporting objectives. Based on a systematic literature review, this study investigates for a comprehensive sample of US firms the determinants of goodwill write-off behavior. Regression analysis shows that write-off behavior is significantly explained by firms’ economic properties. Only in large, high-profile firms, incentives appear to be significant determinants. These findings suggest that the impairment-only approach does capture goodwill impairment at least to some extent.
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