1003185.pdf
Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issu...
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Peter Lang International Academic Publishers
2019
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oapen-20.500.12657-26859 |
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dspace |
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oapen-20.500.12657-268592022-04-26T12:36:54Z Agency Theory: Methodology, Analysis Stremitzer, Alexander Agency Agency-Theorie Analysis Approach asymmetrische Information Contracts Joint Ventures Kontrakttheorie Methodology Netzwerk Outsourcing private Information Stremitzer Structured Theory Transaktionsbeziehung Vertrag Writing bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KC Economics::KCA Economic theory & philosophy bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KC Economics::KCG Economic growth Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues. 2019-01-10 23:55 2018-12-01 23:55:55 2020-01-14 16:25:43 2020-04-01T11:27:49Z 2020-04-01T11:27:49Z 2018 book 1003185 OCN: 1083018908 9783631754009 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/26859 eng Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversitaet Wien application/pdf n/a 1003185.pdf Peter Lang International Academic Publishers 10.3726/b13920 10.3726/b13920 e927e604-2954-4bf6-826b-d5ecb47c6555 9783631754009 3 241 Bern open access |
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OAPEN |
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English |
| description |
Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues. |
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1003185.pdf |
| spellingShingle |
1003185.pdf |
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1003185.pdf |
| title_full |
1003185.pdf |
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1003185.pdf |
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1003185.pdf |
| publisher |
Peter Lang International Academic Publishers |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| _version_ |
1771297627001847808 |
