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oapen-20.500.12657-295602023-02-01T08:49:18Z Emerging Market Economies and Financial Globalization Stanley, Leonardo Economics Brazil China Exchange rate Financial crisis of 2007–08 Renminbi bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KC Economics::KCL International economics::KCLF International finance In the past, foreign shocks arrived to national economies mainly through trade channels, and transmissions of such shocks took time to come into effect. However, after capital globalization, shocks spread to markets almost immediately. Despite the increasing macroeconomic dangers that the situation generated at emerging markets in the South, nobody at the North was ready to acknowledge the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the inner weakness of “decontrolled” financial innovations because they were enjoying from the “great moderation.” Monetary policy was primarily centered on price stability objectives, without considering the mounting credit and asset price booms being generated by market liquidity and the problems generated by this glut. Mainstream economists, in turn, were not majorly attracted in integrating financial factors in their models. External pressures on emerging market economies (EMEs) were not eliminated after 2008, but even increased as international capital 2018-08-23 23:55 2020-03-16 03:00:26 2020-04-01T12:32:15Z 2020-04-01T12:32:15Z 2017-04-30 book 1000373 OCN: 1027760964 9781783086740 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/29560 eng application/pdf n/a 1000373.pdf http://www.anthempress.com/emerging-markets-economies-and-financial-globalization Anthem Press 10.2307/j.ctt216683k 100710 10.2307/j.ctt216683k 78b9942e-c650-46e0-882a-0ab8cddd7fe9 b818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9 9781783086740 Knowledge Unlatched (KU) 100710 KU Select 2016 Front List Collection Knowledge Unlatched open access
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In the past, foreign shocks arrived to national economies mainly through trade channels, and transmissions of such shocks took time to come into effect. However, after capital globalization, shocks spread to markets almost immediately. Despite the increasing macroeconomic dangers that the situation generated at emerging markets in the South, nobody at the North was ready to acknowledge the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the inner weakness of “decontrolled” financial innovations because they were enjoying from the “great moderation.” Monetary policy was primarily centered on price stability objectives, without considering the mounting credit and asset price booms being generated by market liquidity and the problems generated by this glut. Mainstream economists, in turn, were not majorly attracted in integrating financial factors in their models. External pressures on emerging market economies (EMEs) were not eliminated after 2008, but even increased as international capital
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