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oapen-20.500.12657-297032023-01-31T18:45:35Z Essential Vulnerabilities Achtenberg, Deborah Philosophy Emmanuel Levinas God Hippias Meno Phaedrus (dialogue) Plato Socrates bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPQ Ethics & moral philosophy In Essential Vulnerabilities, Deborah Achtenberg contests Emmanuel Levinas’s idea that Plato is a philosopher of freedom for whom thought is a return to the self. Instead, Plato, like Levinas, is a philosopher of the other. Nonetheless, Achtenberg argues, Plato and Levinas are different. Though they share the view that human beings are essentially vulnerable and essentially in relation to others, they conceive human vulnerability and responsiveness differently. For Plato, when we see beautiful others, we are overwhelmed by the beauty of what is, by the vision of eternal form. For Levinas, we are disrupted by the newness, foreignness, or singularity of the other. The other, for him, is new or foreign, not eternal. The other is unknowable singularity. By showing these similarities and differences, Achtenberg resituates Plato in relation to Levinas and opens up two contrasting ways that self is essentially in relation to others. 2018-07-10 23:55 2020-03-12 03:00:31 2020-04-01T12:36:14Z 2020-04-01T12:36:14Z 2016-12-31 book 1000242 OCN: 1076638326 9780810129948 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/29703 eng Rereading Ancient Philosophy application/pdf n/a 1000242.pdf Northwestern University Press 10.2307/j.ctv3znz3r 101386 10.2307/j.ctv3znz3r b4699693-8bd9-4982-b22e-c153becb6f4b b818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9 9780810129948 Knowledge Unlatched (KU) Evanston, Illinois 101386 KU Select 2017: Backlist Collection Knowledge Unlatched open access
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OAPEN
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English
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| description |
In Essential Vulnerabilities, Deborah Achtenberg contests Emmanuel Levinas’s idea that Plato is a philosopher of freedom for whom thought is a return to the self. Instead, Plato, like Levinas, is a philosopher of the other. Nonetheless, Achtenberg argues, Plato and Levinas are different. Though they share the view that human beings are essentially vulnerable and essentially in relation to others, they conceive human vulnerability and responsiveness differently. For Plato, when we see beautiful others, we are overwhelmed by the beauty of what is, by the vision of eternal form. For Levinas, we are disrupted by the newness, foreignness, or singularity of the other. The other, for him, is new or foreign, not eternal. The other is unknowable singularity. By showing these similarities and differences, Achtenberg resituates Plato in relation to Levinas and opens up two contrasting ways that self is essentially in relation to others.
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1000242.pdf
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1000242.pdf
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1000242.pdf
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1000242.pdf
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1000242.pdf
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Northwestern University Press
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2018
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1771297567197364224
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