| id |
oapen-20.500.12657-29977
|
| record_format |
dspace
|
| spelling |
oapen-20.500.12657-299772023-02-01T08:49:19Z Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics Rabinoff, Eve Philosophy Akrasia Aristotle Nous On the Soul Perception Phronesis Soul Rabinoff strives to account for ethical perception (aisthesis) in Aristotle’s ethics—to give it a place of importance in ethical choice and action—and to offer an account of the faculty of perception expansive enough to include reception of the ethical significance of particulars. The book is motivated by particular features of Aristotle’s thought and by increasing philosophical awareness that the ethical agent is an embodied, situated individual, rather than a disembodied, abstract rational will. Traditionally, the soul has been understood to have a non-rational part characterized by desire and perception and a rational part characterized by thinking, knowledge, and argument. Depending on how the relationship between the sides is conceived, the non-rational is either a bane to be controlled by the rational, or plays an irreducible role in moral action. By establishing and accounting for perception’s place in ethics, Rabinoff shows the importance for ethical life of integrating both. 2018-06-07 23:55 2020-03-12 03:00:32 2020-04-01T12:41:25Z 2020-04-01T12:41:25Z 2018-02-15 book 650640 OCN: 1017611467 9780810136434 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/29977 eng Rereading Ancient Philosophy application/pdf n/a 650640.pdf Northwestern University Press 10.2307/j.ctv3znz09 101381 10.2307/j.ctv3znz09 b4699693-8bd9-4982-b22e-c153becb6f4b b818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9 9780810136434 Knowledge Unlatched (KU) Evanston, Illinois 101381 KU Select 2017: Front list Collection Knowledge Unlatched open access
|
| institution |
OAPEN
|
| collection |
DSpace
|
| language |
English
|
| description |
Rabinoff strives to account for ethical perception (aisthesis) in Aristotle’s ethics—to give it a place of importance in ethical choice and action—and to offer an account of the faculty of perception expansive enough to include reception of the ethical significance of particulars. The book is motivated by particular features of Aristotle’s thought and by increasing philosophical awareness that the ethical agent is an embodied, situated individual, rather than a disembodied, abstract rational will. Traditionally, the soul has been understood to have a non-rational part characterized by desire and perception and a rational part characterized by thinking, knowledge, and argument. Depending on how the relationship between the sides is conceived, the non-rational is either a bane to be controlled by the rational, or plays an irreducible role in moral action. By establishing and accounting for perception’s place in ethics, Rabinoff shows the importance for ethical life of integrating both.
|
| title |
650640.pdf
|
| spellingShingle |
650640.pdf
|
| title_short |
650640.pdf
|
| title_full |
650640.pdf
|
| title_fullStr |
650640.pdf
|
| title_full_unstemmed |
650640.pdf
|
| title_sort |
650640.pdf
|
| publisher |
Northwestern University Press
|
| publishDate |
2018
|
| _version_ |
1771297551943729152
|
