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oapen-20.500.12657-317682023-01-31T18:45:58Z Veto Power Slapin, Jonathan B. Political Science Amsterdam European integration European Union France Germany Intergovernmentalism Member state of the European Union Status quo Veto Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto—or veto threat—has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration. 2017-03-09 23:55 2020-03-12 03:00:30 2020-04-01T13:48:50Z 2020-04-01T13:48:50Z 2011-09-01 book 625267 OCN: 761220805 9780472117932 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/31768 eng New Comparative Politics application/pdf n/a 625267.pdf University of Michigan Press 10.3998/mpub.2012704 100398 10.3998/mpub.2012704 e07ce9b5-7a46-4096-8f0c-bc1920e3d889 b818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9 9780472117932 Knowledge Unlatched (KU) Ann Arbor 100398 KU Select 2016 Backlist Collection Knowledge Unlatched open access
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OAPEN
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English
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Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members.
Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto—or veto threat—has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
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625267.pdf
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625267.pdf
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University of Michigan Press
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2017
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1771297410503409664
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