9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf

Russia has long been a potential dream partner for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Russia could greatly enhance the cartel’s market power and has several allies among the OPEC member states. During the 2010s, it seemed that the potential of the OPEC–Russia relationship...

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Έκδοση: Taylor & Francis 2020
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-375932020-08-03T08:36:23Z Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia Krutikhin, Mikhail Overland, Indra OPEC Russia co-operation bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPS International relations::JPSN International institutions bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KC Economics::KCL International economics bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPS International relations bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPS International relations::JPSL Geopolitics bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JF Society & culture: general::JFF Social issues & processes::JFFS Globalization bic Book Industry Communication::G Reference, information & interdisciplinary subjects::GB Encyclopaedias & reference works Russia has long been a potential dream partner for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Russia could greatly enhance the cartel’s market power and has several allies among the OPEC member states. During the 2010s, it seemed that the potential of the OPEC–Russia relationship was finally being realized as they grew closer. However, in this chapter we argue that the strengthened dialogue has little impact on physical oil output and the level of mutual commitment remains low. What they do share is an interest in the semblance of cooperation to push oil prices upward through impacting market psychology. This strategy is in line with the postmodern turn in Russian foreign policy, as proclaimed by Vladislav Surkov and others. It also has some important foreign policy side benefits for Russia, such as weakening its international isolation after the conflict in Ukraine and making it possible to simultaneously befriend various Middle Eastern countries that are at odds with each other. The OPEC–Russia dalliance is also convenient for a third party – the USA. Although the USA is still a net oil importer and its consumers dislike high oil prices, they benefit American oil companies and their employees and investors, especially in the shale oil sector. Arrangements between OPEC and Russia are thus not only a happy pro forma marriage, but also a successful ménage à trois. 2020-05-07T08:44:41Z 2020-05-07T08:44:41Z 2017 chapter http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/37593 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf Taylor & Francis Handbook of OPEC and the Global Energy Order Routledge 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb 660c8a54-d4a4-46a2-a6b5-339c2105fad2 Routledge 11 open access
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description Russia has long been a potential dream partner for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Russia could greatly enhance the cartel’s market power and has several allies among the OPEC member states. During the 2010s, it seemed that the potential of the OPEC–Russia relationship was finally being realized as they grew closer. However, in this chapter we argue that the strengthened dialogue has little impact on physical oil output and the level of mutual commitment remains low. What they do share is an interest in the semblance of cooperation to push oil prices upward through impacting market psychology. This strategy is in line with the postmodern turn in Russian foreign policy, as proclaimed by Vladislav Surkov and others. It also has some important foreign policy side benefits for Russia, such as weakening its international isolation after the conflict in Ukraine and making it possible to simultaneously befriend various Middle Eastern countries that are at odds with each other. The OPEC–Russia dalliance is also convenient for a third party – the USA. Although the USA is still a net oil importer and its consumers dislike high oil prices, they benefit American oil companies and their employees and investors, especially in the shale oil sector. Arrangements between OPEC and Russia are thus not only a happy pro forma marriage, but also a successful ménage à trois.
title 9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf
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title_short 9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf
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title_sort 9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf
publisher Taylor & Francis
publishDate 2020
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