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oapen-20.500.12657-398752020-06-24T00:50:23Z The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries Jones, Emily Africa Asia Latin America financial globalization regulatory interdependence international banking standards Basel I Basel II Basel III transnational policy networks bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPA Political science & theory bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KC Economics::KCP Political economy bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPB Comparative politics bic Book Industry Communication::G Reference, information & interdisciplinary subjects::GT Interdisciplinary studies::GTF Development studies bic Book Industry Communication::K Economics, finance, business & management::KC Economics::KCM Development economics & emerging economies Why do governments in some developing countries implement international standards, while others do not? Focusing on the politics of bank regulation, this book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Regulatory interdependence is generated by relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors including investors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions. We explain why it is that some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead to divergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory politics in the periphery, and the ways in which peripheral governments and firms manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization 2020-06-23T14:28:15Z 2020-06-23T14:28:15Z 2020 book https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/39875 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9780198841999.pdf https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-political-economy-of-bank-regulation-in-developing-countries-risk-and-reputation-9780198841999?cc=nl&lang=en& Oxford University Press 10.1093/oso/9780198841999.001.0001 10.1093/oso/9780198841999.001.0001 b9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2 416 Oxford open access
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Why do governments in some developing countries implement international standards, while others do not? Focusing on the politics of bank regulation, this book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Regulatory interdependence is generated by relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors including investors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions. We explain why it is that some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead to divergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory politics in the periphery, and the ways in which peripheral governments and firms manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization
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