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oapen-20.500.12657-464882021-12-24T08:50:24Z Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief Peels, Rik Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPK Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology. 2021-02-02T15:02:16Z 2021-02-02T15:02:16Z 2020 chapter ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_chpt_40 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/46488 eng Routledge Studies in Epistemology application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9780429641794-ch14.pdf Taylor & Francis Epistemic Duties Epistemic Duties Routledge 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb 08bb2f42-63ba-41e2-b1d3-2a6b5bc82182 08bb2f42-63ba-41e2-b1d3-2a6b5bc82182 Routledge 18 open access
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There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
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