| Περίληψη: | Interrogates whether the British government has learned anything from its interventions in the Middle East, from the 1950s to 2016
Learning from history helps states to create foreign and security policy that builds upon successes and avoids past mistakes. Drawing on a wealth of previously unseen documents, sourced by Freedom of Information requests, together with interviews with government and intelligence agency officials, Louise Kettle questions whether the British government has learned anything from its military interventions in the Middle East. She provides an extended commentary on military interventions in the Middle East since the 1950s, including a behind-the-scenes glimpse into Whitehall decision-making and a critical examination of the 2016 Iraq Inquiry report.
The result is a highly original account of key political events that challenges the claims of lessons being learned from recent wars. This book comes at a decisive moment as the ongoing war against Daesh, conflicts in Syria, and Saudi–Iran tensions continue to leave British action in the region as a contemporary reality where lessons from the past could prevent the British government from making the same mistakes again and again.
Case Studies
1956: Suez – Operation Musketeer
1958: Jordan – Operation Fortitude
1961: Kuwait – Operation Vantage
1990–1: Gulf – Operation Granby
2003–9: Iraq – Operation Telic
Key Features
Reveals the relationship between history and policy in No 10, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and across the intelligence community
Exposes the tensions between government departments over crucial foreign policy decisions
Draws on documents obtained through over 30 Freedom of Information requests, including reports from the Gulf and Iraq wars, documents from the Joint Intelligence Committee after Suez and Policy Planning documents from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
The author conducted interviews with current and past officials from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and the intelligence agencies, including diplomats, Ambassadors, research analysts, service personnel, members of the JIC, MoD lessons teams, official historians and witnesses to the Iraq Inquiry
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