Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf

This chapter reflects on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. The discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that date...

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Έκδοση: Oxford University Press 2021
id oapen-20.500.12657-47108
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-471082021-03-10T01:23:45Z Chapter Agentive Phenomenology Mylopoulos, Myrto Shepherd, Joshua Agentive phenomenology, agency, the feeling of doing, comparator model, metacognition bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy This chapter reflects on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. The discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 1980s. Much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical work relevant to agentive phenomenology, the chapter considers its nature, covering questions about the scope of agentive phenomenology, about its relationship to other types of experiences, about the best way to characterize aspects of agentive phenomenology, and about the function of various types of agentive experience. 2021-03-09T09:32:17Z 2021-03-09T09:32:17Z 2020 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/47108 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf Oxford University Press The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness b9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2 f8dcec60-fcea-49d1-bb3a-c3cacb6ddcb4 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 19 Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
institution OAPEN
collection DSpace
language English
description This chapter reflects on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. The discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 1980s. Much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical work relevant to agentive phenomenology, the chapter considers its nature, covering questions about the scope of agentive phenomenology, about its relationship to other types of experiences, about the best way to characterize aspects of agentive phenomenology, and about the function of various types of agentive experience.
title Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf
spellingShingle Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf
title_short Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf
title_full Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf
title_fullStr Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf
title_full_unstemmed Bookshelf_NBK563589.pdf
title_sort bookshelf_nbk563589.pdf
publisher Oxford University Press
publishDate 2021
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