Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf

Given that there is currently no consensus as to exactly which animals are sentient, how should we make moral decisions when we are uncertain as to which of the animals influenced by that decision are sentient? And how relevant is evidence from the neurosciences for making these decisions? In thi...

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Έκδοση: Springer Nature 2021
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-471112022-04-28T11:53:17Z Chapter 13 The Role of Neuroscience in Precise, Precautionary, and Probabilistic Accounts of Sentience Sentience, Consciousness, Arguments by analogy, Precautionary principle bic Book Industry Communication::P Mathematics & science::PS Biology, life sciences::PSA Life sciences: general issues::PSAN Neurosciences Given that there is currently no consensus as to exactly which animals are sentient, how should we make moral decisions when we are uncertain as to which of the animals influenced by that decision are sentient? And how relevant is evidence from the neurosciences for making these decisions? In this chapter, I outline three different approaches toward incorporating uncertainty about sentience into moral decision-making: what I call precise, precautionary, and probabilistic approaches to sentience. I suggest that neuroscientific evidence has different relevance for each of these accounts. Precautionary approaches should be adopted to provide basic protections for animals even when we are uncertain about their sentience, but probabilistic accounts are more relevant for decisions where we need to carefully weigh positive and negative consequences of different possible decisions. Precise accounts can be useful for providing guidance but are not directly relevant for making decisions or guiding policy. 2021-03-09T09:53:52Z 2021-03-09T09:53:52Z 2020 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/47111 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf Springer Nature Neuroethics and Nonhuman Animals 6c6992af-b843-4f46-859c-f6e9998e40d5 6d802550-49a0-49a3-ba19-796c5150e0de d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 13 203132/Z/16/Z Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
institution OAPEN
collection DSpace
language English
description Given that there is currently no consensus as to exactly which animals are sentient, how should we make moral decisions when we are uncertain as to which of the animals influenced by that decision are sentient? And how relevant is evidence from the neurosciences for making these decisions? In this chapter, I outline three different approaches toward incorporating uncertainty about sentience into moral decision-making: what I call precise, precautionary, and probabilistic approaches to sentience. I suggest that neuroscientific evidence has different relevance for each of these accounts. Precautionary approaches should be adopted to provide basic protections for animals even when we are uncertain about their sentience, but probabilistic accounts are more relevant for decisions where we need to carefully weigh positive and negative consequences of different possible decisions. Precise accounts can be useful for providing guidance but are not directly relevant for making decisions or guiding policy.
title Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf
spellingShingle Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf
title_short Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf
title_full Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf
title_fullStr Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf
title_full_unstemmed Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf
title_sort bookshelf_nbk555334.pdf
publisher Springer Nature
publishDate 2021
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