Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf

Preventive detention shares many features with the quarantine measures sometimes employed in the context of infectious disease control. Both interventions involve imposing constraints on freedom of movement and association. Both interventions are standardly undeserved: in quarantine, the detained in...

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Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Hart Publishing 2021
id oapen-20.500.12657-48490
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-484902021-05-06T00:50:34Z Chapter 5 Is Preventive Detention Morally Worse than Quarantine? Douglas, Thomas preventive detention; quarantine bic Book Industry Communication::L Law::LN Laws of Specific jurisdictions::LNF Criminal law & procedure::LNFX Criminal procedure::LNFX1 Sentencing & punishment Preventive detention shares many features with the quarantine measures sometimes employed in the context of infectious disease control. Both interventions involve imposing constraints on freedom of movement and association. Both interventions are standardly undeserved: in quarantine, the detained individual deserves no detention (or so I will assume), and in preventive detention, the individual has already endured any detention that can be justified by reference to desert. Both interventions are, in contrast to civil commitment under mental health legislation, normally imposed on more-or-less fully autonomous individuals. And both interventions are intended to reduce the risk that the constrained individual poses to the public. Yet despite these similarities, preventive detention and quarantine have received rather different moral report cards, with preventive detention attracting far greater criticism. One possible explanation for this is that many people implicitly endorse the view that preventive detention is always, in at least one respect, more morally problematic than quarantine. In this chapter I challenge that view by considering and rejecting six attempts to justify it, beginning with four attempts that I think can be easily dismissed, and proceeding to consider in more detail two attempts that are more resilient to criticism. Ultimately, I argue that all six attempts fail: preventive detention is not always more problematic, in one respect, than quarantine. I conclude by drawing out some implications of my argument. Of course, it does not follow from my argument that preventive detention is not in some cases more problematic than quarantine. A secondary purpose of this chapter, pursued in parallel to the first, is to identify the considerations that determine whether and when preventive detention is indeed in some respect more problematic. 2021-05-05T11:26:50Z 2021-05-05T11:26:50Z 2019 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/48490 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf Hart Publishing Predictive Sentencing 6e5c1b33-df1a-4ad3-a711-cc7d2768d49e 0a34d350-6f8c-449d-904a-1388d97a3752 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 15 Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
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language English
description Preventive detention shares many features with the quarantine measures sometimes employed in the context of infectious disease control. Both interventions involve imposing constraints on freedom of movement and association. Both interventions are standardly undeserved: in quarantine, the detained individual deserves no detention (or so I will assume), and in preventive detention, the individual has already endured any detention that can be justified by reference to desert. Both interventions are, in contrast to civil commitment under mental health legislation, normally imposed on more-or-less fully autonomous individuals. And both interventions are intended to reduce the risk that the constrained individual poses to the public. Yet despite these similarities, preventive detention and quarantine have received rather different moral report cards, with preventive detention attracting far greater criticism. One possible explanation for this is that many people implicitly endorse the view that preventive detention is always, in at least one respect, more morally problematic than quarantine. In this chapter I challenge that view by considering and rejecting six attempts to justify it, beginning with four attempts that I think can be easily dismissed, and proceeding to consider in more detail two attempts that are more resilient to criticism. Ultimately, I argue that all six attempts fail: preventive detention is not always more problematic, in one respect, than quarantine. I conclude by drawing out some implications of my argument. Of course, it does not follow from my argument that preventive detention is not in some cases more problematic than quarantine. A secondary purpose of this chapter, pursued in parallel to the first, is to identify the considerations that determine whether and when preventive detention is indeed in some respect more problematic.
title Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf
spellingShingle Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf
title_short Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf
title_full Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf
title_fullStr Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf
title_full_unstemmed Bookshelf_NBK564167.pdf
title_sort bookshelf_nbk564167.pdf
publisher Hart Publishing
publishDate 2021
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