Bookshelf_NBK540394.pdf
In popular, philosophical and many scientific accounts of addiction, strong desires and other affective states carry a great deal of the explanatory burden. Much less of a role is given to cognitive states than to affective. But as Pickard and Ahmed (2016; see also Pickard 2016) note, addiction may...
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Taylor & Francis
2021
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oapen-20.500.12657-48492 |
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oapen-20.500.12657-484922021-05-06T00:50:35Z Chapter 5 Addiction Levy, Neil addiction bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JF Society & culture: general::JFF Social issues & processes::JFFH Illness & addiction: social aspects In popular, philosophical and many scientific accounts of addiction, strong desires and other affective states carry a great deal of the explanatory burden. Much less of a role is given to cognitive states than to affective. But as Pickard and Ahmed (2016; see also Pickard 2016) note, addiction may be as much or more a disorder of cognition as of compulsion or desire. Pickard’s focus is on denial. In this chapter my focus will be different. I will argue that in many cases at least, we can explain the lapses of abstinent addicts by way of processes that do not involve motivated reasoning (as denial or self-deception plausibly do). Mechanisms that have the role of updating beliefs in response to evidence may alter addicts’ judgments concerning what they have most reason to do (in the precise circumstances in which they find themselves), and thereby cause them to act accordingly 2021-05-05T11:44:46Z 2021-05-05T11:44:46Z 2019 chapter 9781315689197 9781138909281 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/48492 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK540394.pdf Taylor & Francis The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction Routledge 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb 2186a634-f836-44b4-aa04-03eff710ce54 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd 9781315689197 9781138909281 Wellcome Routledge 10 WT104848/Z/14/Z Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access |
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English |
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In popular, philosophical and many scientific accounts of addiction, strong desires and other affective states carry a great deal of the explanatory burden. Much less of a role is given to cognitive states than to affective. But as Pickard and Ahmed (2016; see also Pickard 2016) note, addiction may be as much or more a disorder of cognition as of compulsion or desire. Pickard’s focus is on denial. In this chapter my focus will be different. I will argue that in many cases at least, we can explain the lapses of abstinent addicts by way of processes that do not involve motivated reasoning (as denial or self-deception plausibly do). Mechanisms that have the role of updating beliefs in response to evidence may alter addicts’ judgments concerning what they have most reason to do (in the precise circumstances in which they find themselves), and thereby cause them to act accordingly |
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| publisher |
Taylor & Francis |
| publishDate |
2021 |
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