How we engage in epistemic practice, including our methods of knowledge acquisition and transmission, the personal traits that help or hinder these activities, and the social institutions that facilitate or impede them, is of central importance to our lives as individuals and as participants in soci...

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Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Cambridge University Press 2021
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-485922021-05-12T11:46:56Z Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice Barker, Simon Crerar, Charlie Goetze, Trystan epistemic practice bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPK Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge How we engage in epistemic practice, including our methods of knowledge acquisition and transmission, the personal traits that help or hinder these activities, and the social institutions that facilitate or impede them, is of central importance to our lives as individuals and as participants in social and political activities. Traditionally, Anglophone epistemology has tended to neglect the various ways in which these practices go wrong, and the epistemic, moral, and political harms and wrongs that follow. In the past decade, however, there has been a turn towards the non-ideal in epistemology. Articles in this volume focus on topics including intellectual vices, epistemic injustices, interpersonal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. In addition to exploring the various ways in which epistemic practices go wrong at the level of both individual agents and social structures, the papers gathered herein discuss how these problems are related, and how they may be addressed. 2021-05-12T11:40:45Z 2021-05-12T11:40:45Z 2018 book 9781108712637 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/48592 eng Cambridge University Press 10.1017/S1358246118000528 10.1017/S1358246118000528 7607a2d0-47af-490f-9d2a-8c9340266f8a 93a8bbde-d415-44db-8566-d2994f71483b 9781108712637 262 Cambridge open access
institution OAPEN
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language English
description How we engage in epistemic practice, including our methods of knowledge acquisition and transmission, the personal traits that help or hinder these activities, and the social institutions that facilitate or impede them, is of central importance to our lives as individuals and as participants in social and political activities. Traditionally, Anglophone epistemology has tended to neglect the various ways in which these practices go wrong, and the epistemic, moral, and political harms and wrongs that follow. In the past decade, however, there has been a turn towards the non-ideal in epistemology. Articles in this volume focus on topics including intellectual vices, epistemic injustices, interpersonal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. In addition to exploring the various ways in which epistemic practices go wrong at the level of both individual agents and social structures, the papers gathered herein discuss how these problems are related, and how they may be addressed.
publisher Cambridge University Press
publishDate 2021
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