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oapen-20.500.12657-485932021-05-13T00:50:11Z Chapter 10 Healthcare Practice, Epistemic Injustice, and Naturalism Kidd, Ian James Carel, Havi healthcare practice; epistemic injustice; naturalism bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPK Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge Ill persons suffer from a variety of epistemically-inflected harms and wrongs. Many of these are interpretable as specific forms of what we dub pathocentric epistemic injustices, these being ones that target and track ill persons. We sketch the general forms of pathocentric testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, each of which are pervasive within the experiences of ill persons during their encounters in healthcare contexts and the social world. What’s epistemically unjust might not be only agents, communities and institutions, but the theoretical conceptions of health that structure our responses to illness. Thus, we suggest that although such pathocentric epistemic injustices have a variety of interpersonal and structural causes, they are also sustained by a deeper naturalistic conception of the nature of illness. 2021-05-12T11:46:55Z 2021-05-12T11:46:55Z 2018 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/48593 eng Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK562587.pdf Cambridge University Press Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice 7607a2d0-47af-490f-9d2a-8c9340266f8a d0471a8c-2e06-488b-ab87-c542c60eabc3 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 84 23 Cambridge Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
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Ill persons suffer from a variety of epistemically-inflected harms and wrongs. Many of these are interpretable as specific forms of what we dub pathocentric epistemic injustices, these being ones that target and track ill persons. We sketch the general forms of pathocentric testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, each of which are pervasive within the experiences of ill persons during their encounters in healthcare contexts and the social world. What’s epistemically unjust might not be only agents, communities and institutions, but the theoretical conceptions of health that structure our responses to illness. Thus, we suggest that although such pathocentric epistemic injustices have a variety of interpersonal and structural causes, they are also sustained by a deeper naturalistic conception of the nature of illness.
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