Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf
This chapter examines whether and when the experience of inner speech can be inaccurate and thereby mislead the subject. It presents a view about the representational content of speech experience generally and then applies it to inner speech in particular. On such a view, speech experience typically...
| Γλώσσα: | English |
|---|---|
| Έκδοση: |
Oxford University Press
2021
|
| id |
oapen-20.500.12657-48631 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
dspace |
| spelling |
oapen-20.500.12657-486312021-05-18T00:51:25Z Chapter 9 When Inner Speech Misleads Wilkinson, Sam Fernyhough, Charles inner speech; language; mental state; philosophy bic Book Industry Communication::C Language::CF linguistics::CFA Philosophy of language This chapter examines whether and when the experience of inner speech can be inaccurate and thereby mislead the subject. It presents a view about the representational content of speech experience generally and then applies it to inner speech in particular. On such a view, speech experience typically presents us with far more than simply the low-level acoustic properties of speech: it conveys the relevant mental states of the (actual or hypothetical) speaker. Similarly, inner speech presents inner speakers with their own mental states. In light of this, inner speech can mislead either by presenting the subject with mental states they do not in fact have, or by presenting these mental states as belonging to another agent. The chapter reflects on the sorts of contexts in which either of these could occur. 2021-05-17T08:58:24Z 2021-05-17T08:58:24Z 2018 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/48631 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf Oxford University Press Inner Speech b9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2 35de7ad1-bcd5-424e-b1ff-43f74d041e45 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 17 Oxford Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access |
| institution |
OAPEN |
| collection |
DSpace |
| language |
English |
| description |
This chapter examines whether and when the experience of inner speech can be inaccurate and thereby mislead the subject. It presents a view about the representational content of speech experience generally and then applies it to inner speech in particular. On such a view, speech experience typically presents us with far more than simply the low-level acoustic properties of speech: it conveys the relevant mental states of the (actual or hypothetical) speaker. Similarly, inner speech presents inner speakers with their own mental states. In light of this, inner speech can mislead either by presenting the subject with mental states they do not in fact have, or by presenting these mental states as belonging to another agent. The chapter reflects on the sorts of contexts in which either of these could occur. |
| title |
Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf |
| spellingShingle |
Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf |
| title_short |
Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf |
| title_full |
Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf |
| title_fullStr |
Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bookshelf_NBK538965.pdf |
| title_sort |
bookshelf_nbk538965.pdf |
| publisher |
Oxford University Press |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| _version_ |
1771297456946937856 |
