Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf
There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constitute...
| Γλώσσα: | English |
|---|---|
| Έκδοση: |
Oxford University Press
2021
|
| id |
oapen-20.500.12657-48872 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
dspace |
| spelling |
oapen-20.500.12657-488722021-06-01T00:47:15Z Chapter 7 Socializing Responsibility Levy, Neil moral responsibility; socializing responsibility bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. I argue that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. I conclude by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread ignorance about morally significant facts. 2021-05-31T11:58:06Z 2021-05-31T11:58:06Z 2018 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/48872 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf Oxford University Press Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility b9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2 21946293-b4d2-46b2-98a7-43c9ab1bc486 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 20 Oxford Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access |
| institution |
OAPEN |
| collection |
DSpace |
| language |
English |
| description |
There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. I argue that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. I conclude by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread ignorance about morally significant facts. |
| title |
Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf |
| spellingShingle |
Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf |
| title_short |
Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf |
| title_full |
Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf |
| title_fullStr |
Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf |
| title_sort |
bookshelf_nbk513458.pdf |
| publisher |
Oxford University Press |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| _version_ |
1771297573105041408 |
