Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf

Debates surrounding free will are notorious for their intractability. This is so in spite of the fact that, even at a fairly fine grain of analysis, competing views on the nature of free will are well understood. Why can’t philosophers find common ground? One line of thought that has emerged fairly...

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Έκδοση: Bloomsbury Academic 2021
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-494272021-06-08T01:02:28Z Chapter 4 The Folk Psychological Roots of Free Will Shepherd, Joshua free will; psychology bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy Debates surrounding free will are notorious for their intractability. This is so in spite of the fact that, even at a fairly fine grain of analysis, competing views on the nature of free will are well understood. Why can’t philosophers find common ground? One line of thought that has emerged fairly recently draws on the psychology of concepts. The general idea is that an explanation for persistent disagreement about free will, and perhaps guidance toward resolution, might be found by exploring the psychological roots of “our concept” of free will—for example, those psychological factors that underlie our tendencies to say, of some bit of human behavior, that it was performed of an agent’s own free will, or not. 2021-06-07T12:35:04Z 2021-06-07T12:35:04Z 2017 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49427 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf Bloomsbury Academic Experimental Metaphysics 066d8288-86e4-4745-ad2c-4fa54a6b9b7b 9421e6b5-b64b-4206-b467-8510b6ea497a d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 14 London Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
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language English
description Debates surrounding free will are notorious for their intractability. This is so in spite of the fact that, even at a fairly fine grain of analysis, competing views on the nature of free will are well understood. Why can’t philosophers find common ground? One line of thought that has emerged fairly recently draws on the psychology of concepts. The general idea is that an explanation for persistent disagreement about free will, and perhaps guidance toward resolution, might be found by exploring the psychological roots of “our concept” of free will—for example, those psychological factors that underlie our tendencies to say, of some bit of human behavior, that it was performed of an agent’s own free will, or not.
title Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf
spellingShingle Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf
title_short Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf
title_full Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf
title_fullStr Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf
title_full_unstemmed Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf
title_sort bookshelf_nbk464490.pdf
publisher Bloomsbury Academic
publishDate 2021
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