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oapen-20.500.12657-496072021-06-19T00:56:41Z Chapter 12 Partiality for Humanity and Enhancement Pugh, Jonathan Kahane, Guy human enhancement; bioconservatives bic Book Industry Communication::P Mathematics & science::PS Biology, life sciences::PSB Biochemistry We consider a strategy for justifying bio-conservative opposition to enhancement according to which we should resist radical departures from human nature, not because human nature possesses any intrinsic value, but because it is our nature. The idea is that we can be partial to humanity in the same way that common sense morality allows us to be partial to self, family, lovers, friends or our country. Whilst a similar idea was suggested by Bernard Williams and Jerry Cohen, it was not fully developed, and their arguments fail to mount a serious challenge to many forms of enhancement. We explore a better approach, drawing on recent literature about the nature and grounds of partiality, and attempt to elucidate what partiality for humanity might plausibly involve. We argue, however, that even if such partiality for humanity is defensible, it can at most only set limits on enhancement. 2021-06-17T09:44:08Z 2021-06-17T09:44:08Z 2016 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49607 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK401922.pdf Oxford University Press The Ethics of Human Enhancement b9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2 4df2449a-506a-4796-b39b-00c16041ac29 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome 11 Oxford Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
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We consider a strategy for justifying bio-conservative opposition to enhancement according to which we should resist radical departures from human nature, not because human nature possesses any intrinsic value, but because it is our nature. The idea is that we can be partial to humanity in the same way that common sense morality allows us to be partial to self, family, lovers, friends or our country. Whilst a similar idea was suggested by Bernard Williams and Jerry Cohen, it was not fully developed, and their arguments fail to mount a serious challenge to many forms of enhancement. We explore a better approach, drawing on recent literature about the nature and grounds of partiality, and attempt to elucidate what partiality for humanity might plausibly involve. We argue, however, that even if such partiality for humanity is defensible, it can at most only set limits on enhancement.
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