| spelling |
oapen-20.500.12657-497362022-04-26T11:21:08Z A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation Ray, Debraj agreements, bargaining, blocking, cooperative games, coalitions, coalition formation, coalition structure, efficiency, farsightedness, partition functions bic Book Industry Communication::P Mathematics & science::PB Mathematics::PBU Optimization::PBUD Game theory bic Book Industry Communication::P Mathematics & science::PB Mathematics::PBF Algebra The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods. 2021-07-02T09:22:51Z 2021-07-02T09:22:51Z 2007 book 9780199207954 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49736 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9780199207954.pdf https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-game-theoretic-perspective-on-coalition-formation-9780199207954 Oxford University Press 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001 b9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2 82b91623-47e6-4f28-a454-e8e04fff8e9b 9780199207954 336 Oxford New York University Shanghai NYU Shanghai open access
|
| description |
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
|
