| Περίληψη: | In this paper I analyse the dissent around evidence standards in medicine
and pharmacology as a result of distinct ways to address epistemic losses in
our game with nature and the scientific ecosystem: an “elitist” and a “pluralist”
approach. The former is focused on reliability as minimisation of random and
systematic error, and is grounded on a categorical approach to causal assessment,
whereas the latter is more focused on the high context-sensitivity of causation in
medicine and in the soft sciences in general, and favours probabilistic approaches
to scientific inference, as better equipped for defeasibility of causal inference
in such domains. I then present a system for probabilistic causal assessment
from heterogenous evidence that makes justice of concerns from both positions,
while also incorporating “higher order evidence” (evidence/information about the
evidence itself) in hypothesis confirmation.
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