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Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Why did affluent countries – like Belgium, Greece, Italy or Japan – persistently accumulate so much debt between the 1970s and the 2000s, in times of peace and prosperity, that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default?...

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Έκδοση: University of Michigan Press 2021
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-506732023-12-20T14:40:52Z In The Red Barta, Zsófia Political Science International Relations bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPS International relations Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Why did affluent countries – like Belgium, Greece, Italy or Japan – persistently accumulate so much debt between the 1970s and the 2000s, in times of peace and prosperity, that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default? In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged around the view that the answer is fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures. 2021-09-23T05:33:37Z 2021-09-23T05:33:37Z 2018 book 9780472900923 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/50673 eng application/pdf n/a external_content.pdf University of Michigan Press University of Michigan Press 100858 e07ce9b5-7a46-4096-8f0c-bc1920e3d889 b818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9 9780472900923 Knowledge Unlatched (KU) University of Michigan Press Knowledge Unlatched open access
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language English
description Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Why did affluent countries – like Belgium, Greece, Italy or Japan – persistently accumulate so much debt between the 1970s and the 2000s, in times of peace and prosperity, that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default? In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged around the view that the answer is fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures.
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publisher University of Michigan Press
publishDate 2021
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