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oapen-20.500.12657-540572022-04-15T02:59:24Z Chapter 8 Three Rationales for a Legal Right to Mental Integrity Douglas, Thomas Forsberg, Lisa mental integrity; legal right bic Book Industry Communication::P Mathematics & science::PS Biology, life sciences::PSA Life sciences: general issues Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity. 2022-04-14T14:07:31Z 2022-04-14T14:07:31Z 2021 chapter 9783030692766 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/54057 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Douglas-Forsberg2021_Chapter_ThreeRationalesForALegalRightT.pdf https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-69277-3_8#enumeration Springer Nature Neurolaw 10.1007/978-3-030-69277-3_8 10.1007/978-3-030-69277-3_8 6c6992af-b843-4f46-859c-f6e9998e40d5 ad387141-94f3-455c-9cb3-3fb5645c7280 178e65b9-dd53-4922-b85c-0aaa74fce079 9783030692766 European Research Council (ERC) 23 819757 ProtMind H2020 European Research Council H2020 Excellent Science - European Research Council open access
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OAPEN
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DSpace
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English
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Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity.
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Douglas-Forsberg2021_Chapter_ThreeRationalesForALegalRightT.pdf
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Douglas-Forsberg2021_Chapter_ThreeRationalesForALegalRightT.pdf
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Douglas-Forsberg2021_Chapter_ThreeRationalesForALegalRightT.pdf
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| title_full |
Douglas-Forsberg2021_Chapter_ThreeRationalesForALegalRightT.pdf
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Douglas-Forsberg2021_Chapter_ThreeRationalesForALegalRightT.pdf
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Douglas-Forsberg2021_Chapter_ThreeRationalesForALegalRightT.pdf
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douglas-forsberg2021_chapter_threerationalesforalegalrightt.pdf
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Springer Nature
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2022
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https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-69277-3_8#enumeration
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1771297609632186368
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