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oapen-20.500.12657-542662022-05-05T02:54:57Z Chapter 1 Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status Clarke, Steve Savulescu, Julian artificial intelligence, cyborgs, human brain organoids, human non-human chimeras, moral uncertainty, moral status, post-humans, slavery, species membership, uploaded minds bic Book Industry Communication::U Computing & information technology::UY Computer science::UYQ Artificial intelligence Recent technological developments and potential technological developments of the near future require us to try to think clearly about what it is to have moral status and about when and why we should attribute moral status to beings and entities. What should we say about the moral status of human non-human chimeras, human brain organoids, artificial intelligence, cyborgs, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into a computer, or onto the internet? In this introductory chapter we survey some key assumptions ordinarily made about moral status that may require rethinking. These include the assumptions that all humans who are not severely cognitively impaired have equal moral status, that possession of the sophisticated cognitive capacities typical of human adults is necessary for full moral status, that only humans can have full moral status, and that there can be no beings with higher moral status than ordinary adult humans. We also need to consider how we should treat beings and entities when we find ourselves uncertain about their moral status. 2022-05-04T14:08:45Z 2022-05-04T14:08:45Z 2021 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/54266 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK572928.pdf Oxford University Press Rethinking Moral Status 10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0001 10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0001 b9501915-cdee-4f2a-8030-9c0b187854b2 05089193-24b1-46b1-861a-864457fa6f15 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd Wellcome Oxford WT203132/Z/16/Z Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
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Recent technological developments and potential technological developments of the near future require us to try to think clearly about what it is to have moral status and about when and why we should attribute moral status to beings and entities. What should we say about the moral status of human non-human chimeras, human brain organoids, artificial intelligence, cyborgs, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into a computer, or onto the internet? In this introductory chapter we survey some key assumptions ordinarily made about moral status that may require rethinking. These include the assumptions that all humans who are not severely cognitively impaired have equal moral status, that possession of the sophisticated cognitive capacities typical of human adults is necessary for full moral status, that only humans can have full moral status, and that there can be no beings with higher moral status than ordinary adult humans. We also need to consider how we should treat beings and entities when we find ourselves uncertain about their moral status.
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