| spelling |
oapen-20.500.12657-566862022-06-10T02:54:05Z Chapter 8 Painful Experience and Constitution of the Intersubjective Self Stanier, Jessica Miglio, Nicole Husserl; Critical phenomenology; Lived-Body; Intersubjectivity; Normativity bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPC History of Western philosophy::HPCF Western philosophy, from c 1900 -::HPCF3 Phenomenology & Existentialism In this paper, we discuss how phenomenology might cogently express the way painful experiences are layered with complex intersubjective meaning. In particular, we propose a critical conception of pain as an intricate multi-levelled phenomenon, deeply ingrained in the constitution of one’s sense of bodily self and emerging from a web of intercorporeal, social, cultural, and political relations. In the first section, we review and critique some conceptual accounts of pain. Then, we explore how pain is involved in complex ways with modalities of pleasure and displeasure, enacted personal meaning, and contexts of empathy or shame. We aim to show why a phenomenology of pain must acknowledge the richness and diversity of peculiar painful experiences. The second section then weaves these critical insights into Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment, sensation, and localisation. We introduce the distinction between Body-Object and Lived-Body to show how pain presents intersubjectively (e.g. from a patient to a clinician). Furthermore, we stress that,while pain seems to take amarginal position inHusserl’s whole corpus, its role is central in the transcendental constitution of the Lived-Body, interacting with the personal, interpersonal, and intersubjective levels of experiential constitution. Taking a critical-phenomenological perspective,wethen concretely explore how some peoplemay experience structural conditions whichmay make their experiences more or less painful. 2022-06-09T08:45:33Z 2022-06-09T08:45:33Z 2021 chapter 9783030656126 9783030656157 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/56686 eng application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International Bookshelf_NBK569899.pdf Springer Nature Phenomenology of Bioethics 10.1007/978-3-030-65613-3_8 10.1007/978-3-030-65613-3_8 6c6992af-b843-4f46-859c-f6e9998e40d5 f1712569-19b6-4ee6-8303-e156f0b361a2 d859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd 9783030656126 9783030656157 Wellcome 14 203109/Z/16/Z Wellcome Trust Wellcome open access
|
| description |
In this paper, we discuss how phenomenology might cogently express
the way painful experiences are layered with complex intersubjective meaning. In
particular, we propose a critical conception of pain as an intricate multi-levelled
phenomenon, deeply ingrained in the constitution of one’s sense of bodily self and
emerging from a web of intercorporeal, social, cultural, and political relations. In
the first section, we review and critique some conceptual accounts of pain. Then,
we explore how pain is involved in complex ways with modalities of pleasure and
displeasure, enacted personal meaning, and contexts of empathy or shame. We aim
to show why a phenomenology of pain must acknowledge the richness and diversity
of peculiar painful experiences. The second section then weaves these critical
insights into Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment, sensation, and localisation.
We introduce the distinction between Body-Object and Lived-Body to show
how pain presents intersubjectively (e.g. from a patient to a clinician). Furthermore,
we stress that,while pain seems to take amarginal position inHusserl’s whole corpus,
its role is central in the transcendental constitution of the Lived-Body, interacting
with the personal, interpersonal, and intersubjective levels of experiential constitution.
Taking a critical-phenomenological perspective,wethen concretely explore how
some peoplemay experience structural conditions whichmay make their experiences
more or less painful.
|