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oapen-20.500.12657-578412022-08-09T03:03:21Z Evading the Patronage Trap Palmer-Rubin, Brian Patronage trap, Mexico, clientelism, interest organizations, interest representation, demand making, civil society, political parties, development policy, agriculture, business chambers, subsidies, linkages, distributive politics, Fondo PyME, Alianza para el Campo, PRI, PAN, PRD, Confederación Nacional Campesina, CNC, Central Campesina Cardenista, CCC, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadores, ANEC, Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana, COPARMEX, Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo, CONCANACO, Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación, CANACINTRA, Jalisco, Michoacán, Estado de México bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government::JPQ Central government::JPQB Central government policies Why have Latin American democracies proven unable to confront the structural inequalities that cripple their economies and stymie social mobility? Brian Palmer-Rubin contends that we may lay the blame on these countries’ systems of interest representation, which exhibit “biased pluralism,” a system in which the demands of organizations representing economic elites—especially large corporations—predominate. A more inclusive model of representation would not only require a more encompassing and empowered set of institutions to represent workers, but would also feature spaces for non-eliteproducers—such as farmers and small-business owners to have a say in sectoral economic policies. With analysis drawing on over 100 interviews, an original survey, and official government data, this book focuses on such organizations and develops an account of biased pluralism in developing countries typified by the centrality of patronage—discretionarily allocated state benefits. Rather than serving as conduits for demand-making about development models, political parties and interest organizations often broker state subsidies or social programs, augmenting the short-term income of beneficiaries, but doing little to improve their long-term economic prospects. When organizations become diverted into patronage politics, the economic demands of the masses go unheard in the policies that most affect their lives, and along the way, their economic interests go unrepresented. 2022-08-08T09:31:10Z 2022-08-08T09:31:10Z 2022 book 9780472075447 9780472055449 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/57841 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9780472902873.pdf https://www.bibliovault.org/thumbs/978-0-472-05544-9-highres.jpg; https://www.bibliovault.org/thumbs/978-0-472-05544-9-frontcover.jpg; https://www.bibliovault.org/thumbs/978-0-472-05544-9-thumb.jpg University of Michigan Press 10.3998/mpub.12132850 10.3998/mpub.12132850 e07ce9b5-7a46-4096-8f0c-bc1920e3d889 b818ba9d-2dd9-4fd7-a364-7f305aef7ee9 9780472075447 9780472055449 Knowledge Unlatched (KU) 328 Knowledge Unlatched open access
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Why have Latin American democracies proven unable to confront the structural inequalities that cripple their economies and stymie social mobility? Brian Palmer-Rubin contends that we may lay the blame on these countries’ systems of interest representation, which exhibit “biased pluralism,” a system in which the demands of organizations representing economic elites—especially large corporations—predominate. A more inclusive model of representation would not only require a more encompassing and empowered set of institutions to represent workers, but would also feature spaces for non-eliteproducers—such as farmers and small-business owners to have a say in sectoral economic policies.
With analysis drawing on over 100 interviews, an original survey, and official government data, this book focuses on such organizations and develops an account of biased pluralism in developing countries typified by the centrality of patronage—discretionarily allocated state benefits. Rather than serving as conduits for demand-making about development models, political parties and interest organizations often broker state subsidies or social programs, augmenting the short-term income of beneficiaries, but doing little to improve their long-term economic prospects. When organizations become diverted into patronage politics, the economic demands of the masses go unheard in the policies that most affect their lives, and along the way, their economic interests go unrepresented.
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